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IMPORTANT — PLEASE READ BEFORE PROCEEDING
This report is produced in the public interest by Britain Needs Us, an independent research and accountability platform. It is not commissioned, funded, or endorsed by any government body, political party, corporation, or regulated entity.
1. Nature of This Publication
This report constitutes a work of public interest journalism and opinion within the meaning of the Defamation Act 2013. MJAF scores are presented as honest opinion (s.3) based on verifiable facts from publicly available career data and government records. The publication is made in the public interest (s.4). All factual claims are believed to be true (s.2).
2. What This Report Does NOT Allege
This report does not allege incompetence in any individual or personal sense. It assesses structural fitness-for-role against standardised criteria applied equally to all subjects. It does not allege wrongdoing, corruption, negligence, or illegality by any named individual. The system of political appointment — not any individual minister — is the subject of this report's criticism.
3. Accuracy and Sources
All data is sourced from: Parliament.uk official records, Gov.uk ministerial biographies, Institute for Government Whitehall Monitor 2024, Spencer Stuart FTSE CEO Survey 2024, NAO departmental overviews, Register of Members' Financial Interests, Companies House, CPS Annual Reports, NHS England, and Hansard. Where estimates are used, this is stated.
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Any minister or individual assessed in this report who wishes to provide additional context, correct any factual statement, or submit a response is invited to contact research@britainneedsus.co.uk. Any substantive factual correction or response will be published as an addendum to this report within 5 working days.
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Section 1 — Job Descriptions: What Each Role Should Require
If these were real jobs, here is what the postings would say
No written job description exists for any Secretary of State. This section constructs what a credible role specification would look like for three of the most consequential cabinet positions, drawing on equivalent private-sector roles, the actual responsibilities of the department, and the competency frameworks used in FTSE-100 executive recruitment. The contrast between what these roles demand and the process by which they are filled is the central argument of this report.
The methodology follows standard executive search practice: each role is defined by its organisational scope, key responsibilities, minimum qualifications, comparable private-sector positions, and measurable performance indicators. We have consulted publicly available materials from Spencer Stuart, Heidrick & Struggles, and the NHS Leadership Academy to ensure the qualification criteria reflect genuine market practice rather than aspirational standards. Where possible, we have identified the specific KPIs that a competent holder of the role would be expected to meet, drawn from departmental performance frameworks, NAO assessments, and Select Committee recommendations. The salary comparison is included not to suggest ministers are underpaid — though they are, dramatically, relative to the scale of their responsibilities — but to illustrate the market value of the competencies these roles genuinely require.
Department Budget Scale: The Organisations These Ministers Run (£bn, 2024–25)
Source: HM Treasury PESA 2024. For context: FTSE-100 largest company revenue (Shell UK) ~£40bn.
Secretary of State for Health and Social Care
Annual Budget: £182 billion • Staff: ~1.4 million (NHS) • Arm’s Length Bodies: 28
Organisational Overview
The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) oversees the NHS — the world’s fifth-largest employer — along with Public Health England (now UKHSA), the Care Quality Commission, NHS England, Health Education England, and 28 arm’s length bodies. The Secretary of State is personally accountable to Parliament for the entirety of NHS spending, social care policy, public health strategy, pharmaceutical regulation, and pandemic preparedness. The role combines the scale of a global conglomerate CEO with the political exposure of a head of state.
Key Responsibilities
- Strategic direction of the NHS Long Term Plan and successor frameworks, including digital transformation and workforce planning across 350+ trusts
- Oversight of £182bn annual budget allocation across acute, primary, community, and social care settings, with direct accountability to the Treasury and Parliament
- Management of the social care reform agenda, including funding models, workforce recruitment, and integration with NHS services
- Pharmaceutical regulation and pricing negotiations, including NICE appraisal processes and the Voluntary Pricing and Access Scheme (VPAS)
- Pandemic preparedness and public health emergency response, including stockpile management and international coordination through WHO and G7 frameworks
- Workforce strategy for 1.4 million NHS staff, addressing vacancy rates exceeding 110,000, pension reform, and pay review body recommendations
- Capital investment programme including 40+ new hospital builds, diagnostic hub rollout, and primary care estate modernisation
Minimum Qualifications (Private-Sector Equivalent)
- 10+ years executive leadership in healthcare, life sciences, or large-scale service delivery (minimum P&L responsibility of £1bn+)
- Demonstrated experience managing complex regulated environments with multiple stakeholder groups
- Track record of organisational transformation at scale, ideally within unionised workforces
- Financial literacy sufficient to manage multi-year capital programmes and cross-subsidy allocation models
- Understanding of clinical governance, patient safety frameworks, and quality assurance systems
Comparable Private-Sector Role
CEO of a major integrated health system (e.g., Kaiser Permanente, Fresenius, Bupa Group) or CEO of an NHS Foundation Trust cluster with £5bn+ turnover.
Key Performance Indicators
- A&E 4-hour standard: 76% of patients seen within 4 hours (target: 95%)
- 18-week elective pathway: Referral-to-treatment backlog at 7.5m (target: 18 weeks for 92% of patients)
- Cancer 62-day standard: 67% treated within 62 days of urgent referral (target: 85%)
- Mental health access: IAPT recovery rate 50%; crisis team response times varying by region
- Social care: 13,000+ delayed discharges per month attributed to social care availability
- NHS retention: Leaver rate 9.1% annually; nursing vacancy rate 8.4%
Ministerial salary: £67,505
vs
Comparable private role: £350,000 – £600,000+
Secretary of State for Transport
Annual Budget: ~£30 billion • Capital Programme: £100bn+ pipeline • Regulated Entities: 40+
Organisational Overview
The Department for Transport (DfT) oversees Great British Railways (GBR) transition, the residual HS2 programme, National Highways (£27bn Road Investment Strategy), the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the DVLA (processing 33 million registered vehicles), and regulatory frameworks governing 1.7 billion annual rail journeys, 340 billion road vehicle miles, and 284 million annual air passengers. The Secretary of State holds ultimate responsibility for transport safety, infrastructure investment prioritisation, and decarbonisation targets for a sector responsible for 26% of UK greenhouse gas emissions.
Key Responsibilities
- Strategic oversight of GBR creation, including franchise transition, track-train integration, and fare reform
- HS2 programme governance: managing scope, cost escalation (currently £66bn+), and integration with Northern Powerhouse Rail
- National Highways RIS2 delivery and RIS3 planning across 4,300 miles of strategic road network
- Aviation policy including airspace modernisation, airport capacity strategy, and CAA regulatory oversight
- Vehicle regulation, licensing, and the transition to zero-emission vehicles by 2035
- Transport decarbonisation plan delivery, including active travel investment and modal shift targets
- Maritime security, port infrastructure, and post-Brexit customs arrangements for sea freight
Minimum Qualifications
- 10+ years in transport, infrastructure, logistics, or heavy civil engineering at executive level
- Experience managing capital programmes exceeding £1bn with multi-year delivery timelines
- Understanding of economic regulation, safety-critical systems, and multi-modal network planning
- Track record of stakeholder management across public, private, and regulatory bodies
Comparable Private-Sector Role
CEO of DPD Group, Royal Mail, National Highways, or a major rail operator (e.g., Govia Thameslink, FirstGroup). International comparable: CEO of Deutsche Bahn or Transdev Group.
Ministerial salary: £67,505
vs
Comparable private role: £300,000 – £550,000+
Secretary of State for Defence
Annual Budget: £57 billion • Personnel: 153,000 regular forces • Procurement: £12bn/yr through DE&S
Organisational Overview
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) commands the UK’s armed forces (Army, Royal Navy, RAF), manages Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) with annual procurement spend of £12 billion, operates the nuclear deterrent (Continuous At Sea Deterrence, four Vanguard-class submarines), and fulfils the UK’s NATO Article 5 obligations. The Secretary of State is the senior civilian authority responsible for military operations, defence diplomacy, intelligence coordination with the JIC, and the largest single capital investment programme in government. Post-Ukraine, the role has acquired additional urgency: defence spending is set to rise to 2.5% of GDP, with major recapitalisation requirements across all three services.
Key Responsibilities
- Military operations authority: deployment decisions, rules of engagement, and operational oversight
- Defence Equipment Plan management (£242bn 10-year programme), including Type 26/31 frigates, Tempest fighter programme, Ajax AFV recovery, and Dreadnought submarine delivery
- Nuclear deterrent stewardship: Dreadnought programme (£31bn+), warhead replacement, and Continuous At Sea Deterrence posture
- NATO coordination: 2.5% GDP spending commitment, Joint Expeditionary Force leadership, and Baltic security contributions
- Personnel management: recruitment crisis (Army strength 72,500 vs target 82,000), retention incentives, accommodation, and veteran welfare
- Defence industrial strategy: sovereign capability preservation, export licensing, and AUKUS pillar 2 technology sharing
- Intelligence and security coordination with GCHQ, MI5, MI6 through the National Security Council
Minimum Qualifications
- 10+ years leadership in defence, aerospace, heavy industry, or national security at executive level
- Experience managing large-scale procurement programmes with multi-decade delivery timelines
- Understanding of military operations, force structure planning, and international security frameworks
- Financial acumen sufficient to manage £57bn departmental budget with capital/resource split
- Security clearance: Developed Vetting (DV) level
Comparable Private-Sector Role
CEO of BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce Defence, Babcock International, or QinetiQ. International comparable: US Deputy Secretary of Defense (confirmed by Senate with domain expertise requirement).
Ministerial salary: £67,505
vs
Comparable private role: £400,000 – £800,000+
Section 2 — Individual Minister Assessments
Ministerial Job Assessment Framework (MJAF)
MJAF Scoring Framework
Each minister is assessed across five dimensions. Scores are weighted and aggregated to produce a total out of 100. The framework mirrors competency assessment tools used by Spencer Stuart, Heidrick & Struggles, and Korn Ferry in FTSE-100 CEO appointments.
| Dimension | Weight | Max Score | Assesses |
|---|
| 1. Sector Knowledge | 25% | /20 | Direct experience in the policy domain the department covers |
| 2. Financial Capability | 25% | /20 | Experience managing budgets, P&L, capital allocation at scale |
| 3. Leadership Track Record | 20% | /20 | Demonstrated ability to lead large teams, manage stakeholders, drive change |
| 4. Delivery Record | 20% | /20 | Evidence of completing complex projects on time, on budget, to specification |
| 5. Accountability Commitment | 10% | /20 | Willingness to publish KPIs, accept independent scrutiny, resign on failure |
0–39: RED
40–59: AMBER
60–79: GREEN
80–100: EXCEPTIONAL
All 4 Ministers: MJAF Score Comparison Across 5 Dimensions
Scores out of 20 per dimension. Sources: Parliament.uk; Gov.uk; IfG; public records.
MJAF Assessment: The following scores represent honest opinion based on publicly available career data, assessed against the stated MJAF criteria. They are not statements of fact about any individual's personal competence.
Previous: Director of Public Prosecutions 2008–2013
Budget oversight: ~£1.1 trillion (TME)
Prior P&L: CPS ~£600m
Strengths
- Legal intellect and institutional understanding: Five years as DPP required managing a national prosecution service across 13 areas, coordinating with 43 police forces, and appearing before Select Committees. This is genuine executive experience at significant public-sector scale.
- CPS modernisation: Led the digital transformation of case management, introduced the Director’s Guidance framework, and improved conviction rates for violence against women and girls. Demonstrable change leadership within a resistant institution.
- Government familiarity: Understanding of the machinery of government, Whitehall conventions, and parliamentary accountability is deeper than most incoming PMs. Not a career backbencher promoted beyond experience.
Gaps
- No commercial P&L experience: The CPS budget of ~£600m, while substantial, is a cost-centre operation with no revenue generation, no capital allocation decisions, and no commercial risk. Managing £1.1tn TME requires economic judgement, fiscal trade-off analysis, and market-facing credibility that legal training does not provide.
- No economics or financial background: Unlike predecessors Brown (PhD in History but extensive Treasury experience) or Sunak (MBA, Goldman Sachs, hedge fund), Starmer has no formal training in economics, finance, or business management.
- No supply chain or industrial experience: The PM must arbitrate between defence procurement, infrastructure delivery, energy transition, and NHS capital programmes. No prior exposure to any of these operational domains.
MJAF DIMENSION SCORES — KEIR STARMER
Leadership Track Record12/20
Accountability Commitment10/20
OVERALL52/100AMBER
Leadership Track Record
12/20
MJAF Assessment: The following scores represent honest opinion based on publicly available career data, assessed against the stated MJAF criteria. They are not statements of fact about any individual's personal competence.
Previous: Bank of England economist, HBOS, Leeds BS NED
Budget: £1.1tn revenue
Strengths
- Genuine economics training: MSc Economics from LSE, followed by a position as an economist at the Bank of England. This is directly relevant domain expertise — a rarity in UK cabinet appointments. She understands monetary transmission mechanisms, inflation targeting, and central bank independence from the inside.
- Financial services experience: Time at HBOS (retail banking) provides private-sector exposure to P&L management, credit risk, and commercial operations that most politicians entirely lack. Her non-executive directorship at Leeds Building Society adds governance experience.
- Seven years as Shadow Chancellor: Extended preparation in the role, with full access to Treasury briefings, fiscal event responses, and OBR engagement. More shadow preparation time than any recent Chancellor.
Gaps
- No large operational P&L: Bank of England and HBOS roles were analytical and mid-ranking, not executive. She has never run a large organisation, managed a workforce of thousands, or taken ultimate accountability for a balance sheet. The gap between economic analysis and fiscal management at sovereign scale is significant.
- Economist does not equal P&L manager: Understanding how an economy works is not the same as running one. Academic economists consistently underperform in forecasting exercises; the OBR’s own track record on deficit, growth, and tax receipt projections demonstrates the limits of modelling.
- October 2024 Budget forecasts already downgraded: Growth forecasts revised down, borrowing revised up, and employer NIC increase criticised by OBR as partially self-defeating through reduced employment. Early delivery record is mixed.
MJAF DIMENSION SCORES — RACHEL REEVES
Financial Capability13/20
Leadership Track Record11/20
Accountability Commitment9/20
OVERALL58/100AMBER
Financial Capability
13/20
Leadership Track Record
11/20
MJAF Assessment: The following scores represent honest opinion based on publicly available career data, assessed against the stated MJAF criteria. They are not statements of fact about any individual's personal competence.
Previous: NUS President, MP for Ilford North
Budget: £182 billion
Strengths
- Shadow Secretary of State preparation: Three years shadowing the health brief, during which he developed a reform agenda centred on neighbourhood health centres, diagnostic hubs, and elective recovery. Demonstrated genuine policy development, not just opposition critique.
- Personal healthcare experience: Diagnosed with kidney cancer in 2021. Provides patient-perspective insight that is rare among health secretaries and creates an authentic narrative for reform. Understands NHS waiting times and diagnostic pathways from lived experience.
- Reform-minded orientation: Explicitly willing to challenge NHS institutional resistance to change, engage private-sector capacity for elective backlog, and confront BMA on workforce reform. Political courage is a relevant leadership quality.
Gaps
- No clinical qualification or healthcare management experience: Has never worked in any healthcare setting. No understanding of clinical governance, patient safety systems, pharmaceutical regulation, or workforce planning from an operational perspective. A FTSE-100 company in the health sector would not consider a candidate with this background for a CEO role.
- No financial management at scale: Career trajectory — student politics, think tanks, Parliament — includes zero P&L responsibility. The NHS budget of £182bn is larger than the revenue of BP, Tesco, or Unilever. He has never managed a budget of any meaningful size.
- Would not pass NHS Trust CEO screening: The NHS Leadership Academy competency framework for Trust CEO appointments requires demonstrated senior management experience in healthcare, financial accountability, and clinical governance understanding. Streeting would not meet the minimum criteria for the organisations he now oversees.
MJAF DIMENSION SCORES — WES STREETING
Leadership Track Record8/20
Accountability Commitment7/20
OVERALL38/100RED
Leadership Track Record
8/20
Editorial Note: This assessment does not say Wes Streeting will fail as Health Secretary. He may succeed — determination and political will can compensate for gaps in technical expertise. The system, not the individual, is what this report indicts. The question is not whether Streeting is a capable politician, but whether a £182 billion organisation should be led by someone who would not pass its own recruitment screening.
MJAF Assessment: The following scores represent honest opinion based on publicly available career data, assessed against the stated MJAF criteria. They are not statements of fact about any individual's personal competence.
Previous: Deputy Mayor of London (Transport)
Budget: ~£30 billion
Strengths
- TfL experience is directly relevant: As Deputy Mayor for Transport under Sadiq Khan, Alexander oversaw Transport for London — a £10bn+ annual operation covering the Tube, Overground, buses, Crossrail integration, cycling infrastructure, and congestion charging. This is the most directly relevant prior experience of any minister assessed in this report.
- Rail and bus familiarity: Engagement with franchise operators, fare policy, service level agreements, and network planning during her City Hall tenure provides genuine operational context for the national transport brief.
- Crossrail completion: Was in post during the final delivery phase of the Elizabeth line. While she did not lead the project, exposure to a £19bn infrastructure programme’s completion provides relevant experience of major capital project governance.
Gaps
- Political oversight is not operational management: The Deputy Mayor role is a political appointment providing strategic direction and mayoral representation, not an operational management position. TfL is run by a Commissioner and executive team. Alexander set political priorities; she did not manage timetables, procurement, or workforce operations.
- No private-sector transport experience: Has never worked for a transport operator, infrastructure contractor, logistics company, or engineering consultancy. The gap between political oversight and commercial operation is significant.
- No HS2, National Highways, or aviation experience: London transport is a distinct ecosystem. The national brief includes HS2 (the most troubled infrastructure programme in a generation), National Highways (strategic road network), CAA regulation, maritime policy, and decarbonisation targets across all modes. City Hall experience, while valuable, covers approximately 15% of the DfT portfolio.
MJAF DIMENSION SCORES — HEIDI ALEXANDER
Leadership Track Record11/20
Accountability Commitment4/20
OVERALL44/100AMBER
Leadership Track Record
10/20
Section 3 — The Ministerial Churn Problem
Turnover rates that no serious organisation would tolerate
The single most damaging structural feature of UK government is the rate at which ministers are moved between departments. The Institute for Government has repeatedly demonstrated that ministerial effectiveness increases significantly after the 24-month mark, yet the average tenure in the most consequential domestic portfolios falls well below this threshold. The result is a permanent state of institutional amnesia: each new Secretary of State spends three to six months being briefed, six to twelve months developing their own agenda, and is then moved on before implementation. The following table quantifies this dysfunction.
The cost is not merely abstract. When Andrew Lansley’s Health and Social Care Act 2012 was partially reversed by his successor Jeremy Hunt, the NHS spent an estimated £3 billion on structural reorganisation — money that bought no additional patient care. When the housing portfolio changed hands three times in two years under the Johnson and Truss governments, the planning reform white paper was abandoned, the building safety regime was delayed, and the affordable housing programme was reset. Each transition generates a cascade of wasted effort: civil servants rewrite briefing packs, policy teams pivot to new ministerial priorities, and delivery programmes are paused pending the new Secretary of State’s “strategic review.” The IfG estimates that a new minister takes an average of six months to reach basic operational competence in their department. In a portfolio with a 13-month average tenure, nearly half the minister’s time is spent learning the job they are about to leave.
| Department |
Secretaries of State since 2010 |
Avg Tenure (months) |
FTSE CEO Avg (months) |
Gap (months) |
| Health & Social Care | 10 | 17 | 66 | −49 |
| Education | 9 | 19 | 66 | −47 |
| Housing / DLUHC | 13 | 13 | 66 | −53 |
| Transport | 8 | 21 | 66 | −45 |
| Home Office | 8 | 21 | 66 | −45 |
| Defence | 7 | 24 | 66 | −42 |
| Household Cost of Ministerial Churn |
| Annual cost per household |
~£1,346/yr |
Estimated cost of policy discontinuity, abandoned programmes, and institutional reset across six departments. Based on NAO identified waste in health, education, and housing reorganisations 2010–2024, divided by 28m households. |
| Benefit of stability |
~£1,346/yr saving |
IfG research shows ministers serving 3+ years achieve measurably better policy outcomes, fewer programme reversals, and stronger departmental morale. The saving is the avoided cost of churn. |
| Net household impact |
~£1,346/yr |
The full cost of political patronage versus merit-based, stable appointment. This is money lost to organisational dysfunction, not to service delivery. |
Average Ministerial Tenure vs FTSE CEO Average (months)
Section 4 — A New Framework for Ministerial Selection
Five reforms that require no constitutional change
The following reforms are designed to be implementable within the existing constitutional framework. None requires primary legislation. None alters the Prime Minister’s prerogative of appointment. Each has precedent in comparable democracies or in the UK’s own public appointments process. Together, they would bring ministerial selection closer to the standards applied in every other area of public life where competence matters.
It is important to state what these reforms are not. They are not an attempt to remove the Prime Minister’s prerogative of appointment — a constitutional convention that predates modern democratic practice and serves the essential function of allowing the PM to form a government quickly. They are not a demand for technocratic government — democratic legitimacy matters, and ministers must retain political accountability to Parliament and the electorate. They are, instead, a set of transparency and scrutiny mechanisms that would allow the public to assess whether their government is being run by people who meet even the most basic professional standards for the roles they hold. Every other public appointment in the UK — from NHS Trust chairs to school governors to magistrates — operates within a published competency framework. The cabinet alone remains exempt from any such requirement. These reforms close that gap without altering the constitutional settlement.
1Published Job Descriptions for Every Secretary of State
Each department publishes a role specification setting out the key responsibilities, required competencies, and performance expectations for its Secretary of State. This does not constrain the PM’s choice — it simply makes transparent what the job requires, allowing voters and Parliament to assess whether appointees meet the stated criteria. Precedent: Australia publishes ministerial charter letters; New Zealand publishes cabinet manual expectations.
2Cross-Party Advisory Panel for Senior Appointments
A small, non-binding advisory panel — comprising former permanent secretaries, business leaders, and domain experts — provides confidential advice to the PM on prospective appointments to the four Great Offices and major spending departments. The panel cannot veto; it can only advise. Precedent: The Commissioner for Public Appointments oversees 10,000+ public body appointments with similar advisory structures. The US Senate confirmation process provides legislative scrutiny of executive appointments.
3Three-Year Minimum Tenure Commitment
The PM publicly commits to a minimum three-year tenure for Secretaries of State, except in cases of resignation, gross misconduct, or general election. This is a political commitment, not a legal constraint. It signals to departments, civil servants, and the public that continuity is valued. Precedent: The Barber Review recommended minimum two-year tenures; several Commonwealth nations operate informal conventions of similar length.
4Annual KPI Review by Select Committee
Each Secretary of State publishes annual key performance indicators agreed with their departmental Select Committee. Progress is reviewed in a dedicated annual evidence session, with a published assessment. This builds on existing Select Committee powers but formalises the performance review function. Precedent: The Public Accounts Committee already conducts similar scrutiny of accounting officers; this extends the model to political leaders.
5Expert Advisory Councils for Each Department
Each major department establishes a standing advisory council of domain experts — clinicians for Health, engineers for Transport, military professionals for Defence — with quarterly access to the Secretary of State and the right to publish an annual assessment of departmental strategy. Precedent: The Chief Scientific Adviser model already provides expert input; this broadens it to cover operational and strategic competence. France’s Conseil d’État provides a comparable structural function.
| Reform | Constitutional Change Required? | Precedent | Annual Benefit (est.) |
|---|
| 1 Published Job Descriptions | No | Australia charter letters, NZ cabinet manual | Transparency; no direct cost saving |
| 2 Advisory Panel | No | Commissioner for Public Appointments; US Senate confirmation | Reduced appointment risk; est. £200m+ in avoided policy failure |
| 3 Three-Year Tenure | No | Barber Review recommendation; Commonwealth conventions | £15bn+ in avoided programme discontinuity (NAO estimates) |
| 4 Annual KPI Review | No | PAC accounting officer scrutiny model | Improved departmental performance; measurable within 2 years |
| 5 Expert Advisory Councils | No | CSA model; France Conseil d’État | Better-informed policy; reduced reliance on political advisers |
| Household Cost-Benefit Summary |
| Current cost of political patronage system |
~£1,346/yr per household |
| Estimated benefit of reform package |
~£1,346/yr saving per household |
| Net position |
Neutral cost to implement; full saving available from reduced waste and improved continuity |
“A surgeon must prove competence before they are allowed to operate. A pilot must log thousands of hours before they take the controls. A minister running a £182 billion health system must only win a seat and please the Prime Minister. We do not accept this standard for the people who fix our boilers, audit our accounts, or teach our children. Why do we accept it for the people who run our country?”
Britain Needs Us — BNU-006-MIN-2026
Methodology: The MJAF Framework in Detail
The Ministerial Job Assessment Framework (MJAF) was developed by Britain Needs Us to provide a structured, repeatable, and transparent method for assessing ministerial fitness-for-role. It draws on three established competency frameworks: the Spencer Stuart Board Effectiveness Index (used by 78% of FTSE-100 boards), the NHS Leadership Academy Healthcare Leadership Model (mandatory for all NHS executive appointments), and the Civil Service Competency Framework (used for Senior Civil Service recruitment at Director and Director General level).
Each of the five dimensions is scored on a 0–20 scale by a panel of assessors using publicly available career information. Scores are not based on private information, personal opinion of the minister’s character, or political alignment. The assessment is strictly limited to: (a) documented career history as available through parliamentary registers, Companies House, LinkedIn professional profiles, and published biographies; (b) departmental performance data from official sources (NHS Digital, DfT statistics, MoD equipment plan reports); and (c) Select Committee evidence sessions and parliamentary voting records.
The weighting structure — 25% Sector Knowledge, 25% Financial Capability, 20% Leadership, 20% Delivery, 10% Accountability — reflects the priorities identified in Spencer Stuart’s annual analysis of FTSE-100 CEO departures. Their data consistently shows that the two leading causes of premature CEO departure are (1) lack of sector knowledge leading to strategic misjudgement, and (2) inadequate financial oversight leading to capital misallocation. Leadership and delivery are weighted at 20% each because, while essential, they are partially compensated by strong senior teams — a luxury that most ministers do not have, given the parallel churn of special advisers. Accountability is weighted at 10% because, while normatively important, it is structurally absent from the current system and therefore difficult to assess meaningfully.
The scoring bands — RED (0–39), AMBER (40–59), GREEN (60–79), EXCEPTIONAL (80–100) — are calibrated against FTSE-100 CEO appointment benchmarks. A score of 60+ indicates that the individual would be considered a credible candidate for an equivalent private-sector role by a major executive search firm. A score below 40 indicates that the individual would not pass initial screening. The AMBER band (40–59) represents candidates who have relevant strengths but significant gaps — individuals who might be considered for a role with strong deputy support and mentoring, but would not be the preferred appointment in a competitive field.
We emphasise that MJAF scores are assessments of structural fitness-for-role, not predictions of ministerial success or failure. A low-scoring minister may succeed through determination, learning agility, and effective delegation. A high-scoring minister may fail through political misfortune, personality clashes, or events beyond their control. The framework measures starting competence, not destiny. Its purpose is to expose the gap between what these jobs require and what the current system delivers.
Sources & References
- Institute for Government, “Ministerial Churn” dataset, 2010–2024. Available at: instituteforgovernment.org.uk/data-visualisation/ministerial-churn
- HM Treasury, “Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2025” (PESA), Cm 9901. Total Managed Expenditure breakdown by department.
- NHS England, “Monthly Integrated Performance Report”, March 2026. A&E, RTT, cancer, and workforce data.
- National Audit Office, “Reorganising Central Government Bodies” (HC 2025). Estimated costs of departmental restructuring and programme discontinuity.
- Spencer Stuart, “UK Board Index 2025”. FTSE-100 CEO tenure analysis, appointment process benchmarks, and board composition data.
- Department for Transport, “Transport Statistics Great Britain 2025”. Rail journeys, road miles, air passenger, and vehicle registration data.
- Ministry of Defence, “Defence Equipment Plan 2025–2035”. Procurement pipeline, cost estimates, and programme status assessments.
- Companies House and FCA Disclosure Records. Career history verification for Rachel Reeves (HBOS, Leeds Building Society NED) and other ministers.
- Crown Prosecution Service, “Annual Report and Accounts 2012–13”. Budget, staffing, and performance data during Starmer’s tenure as DPP.
- House of Commons Library, “Ministerial Salaries” briefing paper, SN/PC/1727, updated January 2026. Salary bands and comparisons.
- Institute for Government, “How to Be an Effective Minister” (2024). Analysis of ministerial effectiveness and the relationship between tenure length and policy outcomes across 14 government departments.
- Heidrick & Struggles, “Route to the Top 2025”. CEO appointment trends, competency frameworks, and the increasing demand for sector-specific expertise in FTSE-100 appointments. Data on average time-to-appointment and assessment methodologies.